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NEPA and Indirect Effects of Foreign Activity: 
Limiting Principles from the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality and Transnational Lawmaking 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the major statutory tools in the fight against the adverse 
effects of climate change is the National Environmental Protection 
Act (“NEPA” or “The Act”).1 Enacted in 1970, NEPA requires all 
federal agencies to prepare a “detailed statement” on the 
environmental impact of all “major Federal actions.”2 While it is 
indisputable that NEPA applies to federal actions within the 
domestic sphere, recent commentators have advocated using NEPA’s 
requirements more aggressively as a weapon against global activities 
that may be harmful to the earth’s climate.3 This new wave of 
litigation and environmental advocacy not only asserts that domestic 
activity falls within NEPA’s requirements, but that extraterritorial 
activity which may have a potential impact on climate change should 
also be evaluated in federal agencies’ Environmental Impact 
Statements and Environmental Assessments.4 
The application of NEPA to extraterritorial activity has been 
examined in numerous journals and forums.5 However, recent 
 
 1. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Frederick R. Anderson & Geraldine E. Edens, Climate Change and the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 2006 No. 1 RMMLF-INST Paper No. 12A (2006) (“The use of NEPA to 
address climate change has barely begun . . . . [T]he cases which climate advocates have said 
they plan to file, already show the contours of the new ‘campaign.’”). 
 4. See, e.g., Maura M. Kelley, Note, Environmental Responsibilities Overseas: The National 
Environmental Policy Act and the Export-Import Bank, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 335, 354 (2007) 
(arguing that “[d]espite a lack of explicit language making NEPA applicable to extraterritorial 
federal actions, the statute should not be limited to solely domestic projects”). 
 5. See, e.g., Randall S. Abate, Dawn of A New Era in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. 
Environmental Statutes: A Proposal for an Integrated Judicial Standard Based on the Continuum of 
Context, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 87 (2006); Barry N. Breen, International Application Of The 
National Environmental Policy Act, C806 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 419; Caleb W. Christopher, Success by A 
Thousand Cuts: The Use of Environmental Impact Assessment in Addressing Climate Change, 9 VT. J. 
ENVTL. L. 549 (2008); Joan R. Goldfarb, Extraterrritorial Compliance with NEPA Amid the Current 
Wave of Environmental Alarm, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 543 (1991); Jeffrey E. Gonzalez-Perez 
& Douglas A. Klein, The International Reach of the Environmental Impact Statement Requirement of the 
National Environmental Policy Act, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 757 (1994); Scott C. Whitney, Should the 
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arguments from non-governmental organizations and other groups 
challenging a coal company’s application to export coal to Asia under 
Washington’s State Environmental Protection Act (“SEPA”),6 
Washington’s version of NEPA, warrants a closer examination of 
whether federal agencies should be required to consider indirect effects 
from extraterritorial activity in their NEPA analysis.7 This Comment 
will attempt to fill two gaps in the current scholarship. First, this 
Comment will address whether NEPA requires the consideration of 
indirect effects of extraterritorial activity. Next, it will examine the 
extraterritorial reach of NEPA by applying international law and 
transnational lawmaking factors that have largely been ignored by 
commentators. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that U.S. 
agencies should not be required under NEPA to include in their 
reporting requirements the indirect effects of activities that take 
place within a foreign, sovereign nation for two reasons. First, U.S. 
courts should apply the presumption against extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law on foreign state activities committed by 
foreign actors. Second, there should be broad consensus in solving 
environmental concerns, and applying NEPA to foreign activity could 
inhibit this crucial international lawmaking process. 
Part II of this Comment introduces NEPA and explains the 
brewing controversy regarding coal exports from U.S. shipping 
terminals. Part II also describes the argument from environmental 
groups that the indirect effects of extraterritorial activity should be 
included in the analysis of environmental impacts required under 
NEPA. Part III discusses the federal common law presumption 
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Part IV examines 
three factors of international law and transnational lawmaking—the 
 
National Environmental Policy Act Be Extended to Major Federal Decisions Significantly Affecting the 
Environment of Sovereign Foreign States and the Global Commons, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 431 (1990); 
Sara E. Baynard, Note, The Extraterritorial Reach of NEPA and the Creation of a Foreign Policy 
Exemption, 28 VT. L. REV. 173 (2003); Deirdre Goldfarb, Comment, NEPA: Application in the 
Territorial Seas, the Exclusive Economic Zone, the Global Commons, and Beyond, 32 SW. U. L. REV. 735 
(2003); Karen A. Klick, Note, The Extraterritorial Reach of NEPA’s EIS Requirement After 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 291 (1994); Silvia M. Riechel, Note, 
Governmental Hypocrisy and the Extraterritorial Application of NEPA, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 115 
(1994); Douglas J. Rosinski, Note, The Environmental Impact on Foreign Territory from a Proposed 
Federal Action, 4 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 177 (1995). 
 6. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 7. Indirect effects are those “which are caused by the action and are later in time or 
farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2013). 
See also infra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
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link of the activity to the territory of the regulating nation; the 
importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, and 
economic systems; and the interest of another county in regulating 
the activity—and argues that these factors limit the reasonableness 
of the U.S.’ jurisdiction to prescribe law related to the extraterritorial 
application of NEPA. The Comment concludes in Part V with the 
recommendation that NEPA analysis should not be required for the 
indirect effects of extraterritorial activity. 
II. NEPA AND THE WEST COAST COAL TERMINAL DISPUTES 
A. NEPA and the EIS Requirement 
NEPA was enacted in 1970 to “declare a national policy which 
will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and 
his environment,” and “promote efforts which will prevent or 
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate 
the . . . welfare of man . . . .”8 However grand the stated purpose 
of the Act may be, NEPA’s substantive provisions are limited to 
federal administrative agencies and are almost wholly procedural.9 In 
order to foster informed federal decision making and ensure that 
environmental factors are considered, the Act requires federal 
agencies to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for 
any “major Federal action[s] significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment.”10 In some circumstances, an agency may first 
 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2013). 
 9. See, e.g., Mark A. Chertok, Overview of the National Environmental Policy Act: 
Environmental Impact Assessments and Alternatives, SR045 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 757, 759 (“Neither an EIS 
nor NEPA itself dictates any particular result. NEPA is essentially a procedural statute; it 
establishes procedural steps, such as the preparation of an EIS, which, once satisfied, do not 
dictate any particular substantive decision.”). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A)–(C). The relevant statutory language states 
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible . . . all 
agencies of the Federal Government shall— 
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other 
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a 
detailed statement by the responsible official on— 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal 
be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be 
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prepare an Environmental Assessment (“EA”), the ambit of which is 
more limited and less involved than an EIS, to determine if the 
effects of the federal action are significant enough to require an 
EIS.11 Although an agency is required to prepare an EIS or an EA for 
any major federal action, the findings or suggestions of these 
analyses are not prescriptive.12 
Federal regulations require that an EIS consider both the direct 
and indirect effects of a proposed agency action.13 Direct effects are 
“caused by the action and occur at the same time and place.”14 
Indirect effects are those that “are caused by the action and are later 
in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably 
foreseeable.”15 These indirect effects may include “growth inducing 
effects and other effects related to induced changes in the pattern of 
land use, population density or growth rate, and related effects on air 
and water and other natural systems, including ecosystems.”16 
Courts have interpreted the NEPA regulations that require 
indirect effects in an agency’s EIS to include climate change 
considerations. One reported decision from the Eighth Circuit 
regarding NEPA’s consideration of greenhouse gas emissions is 
noteworthy because it suggests that NEPA analyses should include 
even generalized impacts from climate change. In Mid States Coalition 
for Progress v. Surface Transportation Board, the court remanded a 
railroad expansion project to transport coal from the Powder River 
Basin back to the approving agency to prepare a supplemental EIS to 
consider “the effects that may occur as a result of the reasonably 
foreseeable increase in coal consumption.”17 Significant to the 
extraterritorial discussion, the Mid States court did not comment  
 
 
 
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
Id. 
 11. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4. 
 12. See, e.g., Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) 
(“[I]t is now well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply 
prescribes the necessary process.”). 
 13. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16. 
 14. Id. § 1508.8. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 550 (8th Cir. 
2003). 
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about the increase of coal consumption internationally, but kept its 
analysis to the domestic utilities market.18 
The requirements of an EIS are often costly and time-consuming 
as the process of creating an EIS from draft to a final report can take 
years, sometimes nearly a decade.19 As a result, the ultimate timing 
for the resolution of the EIS process and the final costs of the EIS are 
usually unpredictable. Not surprisingly, opponents of development 
projects often use NEPA as a litigation tactic to delay, and ultimately 
derail, a project.20 One frequently used litigation tactic is challenging 
the sufficiency of EA and EIS analyses.21 In fact, many 
environmental groups have increasingly resorted to NEPA litigation 
 
 18. Id. at 549 (“The increased availability of inexpensive coal will at the very least make 
coal a more attractive option to future entrants into the utilities market when compared with 
other potential fuel sources, such as nuclear power, solar power, or natural gas. Even if this 
project will not affect the short-term demand for coal, which is possible since most existing 
utilities are single-source dependent, it will most assuredly affect the nation’s long-term demand 
for coal . . . .”). 
 19. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 918 (2002) (noting a Federal 
Highway Administration Study that reported an average EIS required 3.6 years to complete, with 
some EISs taking up to 12 years to complete). 
 20. For example, a geothermal power plant proposed in California was the subject of an 
EIS issued in 1998. Ironically, while that project (if built) would supply clean, renewable energy 
to northern California, it has been the subject of almost constant litigation requiring additional 
consideration of impacts to cultural resources and still has not been constructed. See Pit River 
Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 615 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2010). According to counsel for the project 
proponent, the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management are about to commence 
preparation of a new EIS for the project, which could take two to four more years. See Telephone 
Interview with Craig Galli, Partner, Holland & Hart (Nov. 26, 2012). See also Steven W. Weston 
& Barbara Biles, National Environmental Policy Act: Issues Impacting Construction, 14 CONSTR. LAW. 
4, 4 (1994) (“[I]n practice the environmental review process required by NEPA often has been 
used by opponents of development projects as a delay tactic. In the years since NEPA’s 
enactment, project opponents have become increasingly sophisticated in their ability to 
challenge projects on NEPA grounds both before and after project approval. Their broadside 
attacks now include asserting intricate procedural arguments, bombarding agencies with a 
plethora of suggested alternative sites and mitigation measures, and initiating complicated 
litigation even after a project has been approved and is under way. As a result, the NEPA review 
process has become time-consuming, expensive, and uncertain.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Whither NEPA?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 333, 340 
(2004) (“NEPA litigation—either to decide whether an EIS is required or to determine its 
adequacy once it is produced—adds further costs and delays. Fear of judicial review pushes 
agencies toward ever-lengthier and more elaborate EISs, responding to all major comments 
received in the public notice and comment period. NEPA thus becomes a highly effective tool 
that environmental NGOs and others can use to raise the financial and political costs of projects 
they oppose and stretch out decisions over an extended time frame, giving time to rally political 
opposition. In some cases these delays and associated financial and political costs may be 
enough to derail the project entirely.”). 
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as a vehicle to address greenhouse gas emissions.22 Although the 
majority of these cases focus on domestic activity, a few observers, 
citing the need for the U.S. to take a stronger leadership role to reign 
in climate change, have called for a broader application of NEPA to 
extraterritorial activity.23 One example of this recent development is 
being played out with recent plans to export coal from the U.S. to 
Asia. 
B. A Brewing Controversy in the Development of U.S. Coal Export Shipping 
Terminals 
Non-governmental organizations and other environmental 
groups have employed the NEPA and SEPA24 litigation tactic 
recently during the permitting process against companies that have 
proposed building shipping terminals in the U.S. to export coal to 
Asia.25 In the last three years, at least four companies have proposed 
 
 22. See, e.g., Barnes v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 655 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2011); Hapner v. 
Tidwell, 621 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2010); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 
F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009); N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2006); 
Coal. for a Sustainable 520 v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., C11-1461RSM, 2012 WL 3059404 (W.D. 
Wash. July 25, 2012); Black Mesa Water Coal. v. Salazar, 11-CV08122-PHX-GMS, 2012 WL 
2848437 (D. Ariz. July 11, 2012); Hillsdale Envtl. Loss Prevention, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 10-2008-CM-DJW, 2011 WL 2579799 (D. Kan. June 28, 2011); League of Wilderness 
Defenders-Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Martin, 2:10-CV-1346-BR, 2011 WL 2493765 
(D. Or. June 23, 2011); Amigos Bravos v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 816 F. Supp. 2d 1118 
(D.N.M. 2011); Conservation Nw. v. Rey, 674 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1236 (W.D. Wash. 2009). 
 23. See, e.g., Silvia M. Riechel, Note, Governmental Hypocrisy and the Extraterritorial 
Application of NEPA, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 115, 139 (1994) (arguing that the federal 
government must do more to apply NEPA abroad because “NEPA is among the most effective 
ways the U.S. government can monitor and control its impact on the global environment”). 
 24. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.21C.030 (West). SEPA is Washington’s version of 
NEPA; just as NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare EA and EIS reports, SEPA requires 
state agencies to  
[i]nclude in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other 
major actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment, a detailed 
statement by the responsible official on: 
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action; 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal 
be implemented; 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action; 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of the environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity; and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be 
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented . . . . 
Id. 
 25. Craig Welch, Fights Brewing Over Massive Coal-Export Plans for the Northwest, SEATTLE 
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constructing shipping terminals throughout approximately six sites 
along the Washington and Oregon coasts.26 Once the terminals are 
built, these companies plan to export coal from the Powder River 
Valley deposits in Wyoming and Montana to energy-hungry 
countries in Asia. 
1. Washington permit dispute 
The first company to apply for a permit to build a shipping 
terminal to ship coal to Asia on the West Coast was Millennium 
Bulk Terminals (“MBT”), a U.S. subsidiary of an Australian-owned 
energy and natural resource company.27 Although MBT initially 
received a permit from Cowlitz County in Washington, MBT 
withdrew its application after a coalition of conservation groups, led 
by Earthjustice, appealed the decision to Washington’s Shorelines 
Hearings Board.28 
In its appeal, Earthjustice claimed that Cowlitz County violated 
SEPA when Cowlitz County concluded that issuing a permit for the 
construction of MBT’s proposed coal terminal “would not have a 
significant adverse impact” and therefore did not require an EIS.29 
Earthjustice argued that the state agency did not consider the 
environmental impacts of “transporting coal long distances to the 
[coal terminal], and the impacts of commodity ship traffic in the 
Columbia River and the Pacific Ocean . . . .”30 More significantly, 
Earthjustice contended that the agency did not consider the impacts 
of the “combustion of exported coal in Asia, and the influence of 
increased exports on supply, demand, and the price of coal in 
international markets.”31 Further, Earthjustice maintained that an 
increase in the supply, and a corresponding decrease in price, would 
 
TIMES (May 20, 2012), http://seattletimes.com/avantgo/2018245897.html. 
 26. Erik Olson, Rising Chinese Demand Could Mean Coal Export Boom for West Coast, DAILY 
NEWS ONLINE (March 27, 2012), http://tdn.com/news/local/rising-chinese-demand-could-
mean-coal-export-boom-for-west/article_3d2d744c-7874-11e1-a248-0019bb2963f4.html. 
 27. See Welch, supra note 25. 
 28. Jim Efstathiou Jr., Ambre Energy Drops U.S. West Coast Port Permit After Complaints, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 16, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-16/ambre-energy-
drops-u-s-west-coast-port-permit-after-complaints.html. 
 29. Petition for Review at 2, Shoreline Mgt. Substantial Dev. Permit No. SL10-0916, 
Climate Solutions v. Cowlitz County (Wash. Shorelines Hearings Bd. Dec. 13, 2010), available at 
http://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/LongviewPetition121310.pdf. 
 30. Id. at 4. 
 31. Id. at 5. 
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likely impact “the energy planning decisions in other countries” and 
cause adverse environmental effects by “encouraging greater use of 
coal.”32 
Because MBT withdrew its application before a ruling on the 
merits,33 the Washington Shorelines Hearings Board did not issue a 
ruling on Earthjustice’s appeal. However, MBT has continued its 
effort to secure a permit for its shipping terminal project. In 
September 2012, the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) announced 
that it will begin its review of the project with an EA and will not 
require an EIS for the project.34 Although the Corps could decide at 
any time to require an EIS for the project,35 the absence of an EIS 
almost certainly promises more litigation under NEPA regarding the 
adequacy of the environmental review process for the project. 
The prospect of future litigation over MBT and other similar coal 
shipping terminal construction and operating permit issuance 
prompts questions concerning Earthjustice’s argument explained 
above in its appeal to the Washington Shorelines Hearings Board.36 
Must an agency consider the indirect effects of coal combustion in 
foreign markets? Does NEPA require an agency to assess the 
environmental impacts caused by a foreign sovereign’s energy 
consumption decisions, as influenced by a change in the 
international price of a commodity? Taken more broadly, does NEPA 
require an agency to assess the indirect effects of extraterritorial 
activity within a foreign nation? The answers to these questions have 
wide-ranging implications for future climate change litigation. 
Part III will examine important factors that lead to the 
conclusion that agencies should not be forced to include the indirect 
effects of extraterritorial activity in their NEPA analyses. This Part 
will first examine the federal common law presumption against 
extraterritoriality. Next, Part IV argues that international solutions 
to man’s role in climate change, as implemented through 
international law and transnational lawmaking channels, severely 
inhibit the use of NEPA as an extraterritorial tool in attempting to 
 
 32. Id. 
  33. See Efstathiou, supra note 28. 
 34. Stover E. Harger III, Army Corps Will Not Require Stricter Coal Export Review, PORTLAND 
TRIB. (Sep. 27, 2012), http://portlandtribune.com/pt/9-news/115876-army-corps-will-not-
require-stricter-coal-export-review. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
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expose and influence activity in foreign sovereign nations.  
III. PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Federal agencies should not be required under NEPA to consider 
the indirect effects of extraterritorial activity that occurs in sovereign 
nations in an EIS or EA because of the longstanding presumption 
against the extraterritorial application of U.S. domestic law.37 This 
federal common law canon of construction, recently reaffirmed by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, expresses the principle that “unless there is 
the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed to give a 
statute extraterritorial effect, [the Court] must presume [a statute] 
is primarily concerned with domestic conditions” and should not be 
applied extraterritorially.38 
A. History and General Application 
The presumption against extraterritoriality has been applied in 
U.S. courts since the early nineteenth century.39 In his seminal 
statement for the presumption against extraterritoriality, Justice 
Holmes explained in 1909 that “the general and almost universal 
rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be 
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is 
done.”40 However, the next seven decades of jurisprudence gradually 
eroded the presumption against extraterritoriality such that the 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, published in 1987, 
observed that the presumption was no longer applicable in U.S. 
law.41 
 
 37. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“It is a 
longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent 
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’” (quoting 
Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284–285 (1949))). 
 38. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (quoting Arabian 
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248). 
 39. See, e.g., United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 630–32 (1818) (“Every 
nation provides for such offences the punishment its own policy may dictate; and no general 
words of a statute ought to be construed to embrace them when committed by foreigners against 
a foreign government.”). 
 40. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909). 
 41. See William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 85–86 (1998) (“While paying lip service to American Banana, both the 
Supreme Court and lower federal courts began to ignore its holding in antitrust cases. . . . The 
Restatement (Third), which appeared in 1987, dispensed with the presumption altogether. 
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Since the Restatement (Third) was published, two major 
Supreme Court cases have revived and arguably strengthened the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.42 Beginning with its decision 
in E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. (“Aramco”), and most recently 
in Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court 
readdressed extraterritoriality and clarified the appropriate scope of 
the canon to transnational cases.43 
1. Aramco 
In Aramco, a U.S. citizen filed an action under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 against his American employer for alleged 
discrimination that occurred while he was working in Saudi 
Arabia.44 The employer argued that the district court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over the action because Title VII did not extend 
to citizens employed in foreign territories. Writing the opinion of the 
Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the presumption 
against extraterritoriality “serves to protect against unintended 
clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could 
result in international discord.”45 He explained that Title VII did not 
apply extraterritorially, noting that whether or not Congress has 
exercised its authority to apply a statute extraterritorially “is a 
matter of statutory construction.”46 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
reasoned that certain provisions in Title VII cited by the U.S. 
employee as indicating Congress’s intent to apply the statute 
abroad—such as a clause extending the law to a Untied States 
employer that affects trade “between a State and any place outside 
thereof”—was “boilerplate language” not relevant to applying the 
statute beyond the U.S. territorial borders.47 He suggested that only 
 
It . . . observed that [Justice Holmes’s statement in American Banana] . . . ‘does not reflect 
the current law of the United States.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW § 415, Reporter’s Note 2 (1987))). 
 42. Id. at 86. (“In its 1991 decision in E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. (“Aramco”), 
the Supreme Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to Title VII . . . . What 
was remarkable about Aramco was not just the fact that the court again applied the presumption, 
but the apparent strength of the presumption it applied.”). 
 43. See generally EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 44. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 247. 
 45. Id. at 248. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 249–52. 
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a “clear statement” from Congress was enough to overcome the  
 
presumption against limiting the effects of the statute to U.S. 
territory.48 
2. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. 
Even after Aramco, questions remained about the strength and 
viability of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Within many 
areas of law, including antitrust legislation, trademark protection, 
and federal securities law,49 the presumption against 
extraterritoriality seemed to have been set aside “in favor of 
presumptions that provided for the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law to activities that had a sufficiently close nexus to the 
U.S.”50 The Court sought to address some of this confusion in 2010 
with an examination of the presumption in the context of federal 
securities law.51 In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., Australian 
investors, who had purchased shares of National Australia Bank 
(“National”) on the Australian stock exchange, filed suit against the 
bank in federal district court under §10(b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act.52 The investors alleged that National had 
manipulated its financial models and reports in connection with the 
purchase and operation of a U.S.-based mortgage servicing 
company.53 Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by both the district 
court and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the case was 
granted certiorari by the Supreme Court to consider whether §10(b) 
 
 48. Id. at 258. In his dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice 
Blackmun, vehemently opposed Chief Justice Rehnquist’s characterization of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality as a clear statement rule:  
But contrary to what one would conclude from the majority’s analysis, this canon is 
not a ‘clear statement’ rule, the application of which relieves a court of the duty to 
give effect to all available indicia of the legislative will. Rather, as our case law 
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality well illustrates, a court may 
properly rely on this presumption only after exhausting all of the traditional tools 
‘whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained.’ 
Id. at 261 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
 49. Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 1, 29–46 (1992). 
 50. Id. at 29. 
 51. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
 52. Id. at 2875. 
 53. Id. at 2875–76. 
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of the Securities and Exchange Act provided a cause of action for 
plaintiffs suing a foreign defendant for misconduct related to 
securities traded on a foreign exchange.54 Prior to Morrison, the 
Second Circuit had disregarded the presumption against 
extraterritoriality when interpreting the Securities and Exchange Act, 
instead promulgating an “effects” test55 and a “conduct” test56 to aid 
in determining whether §10(b) should apply extraterritorially.57 
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality “preserves a stable 
background against which Congress can legislate with predictable 
effects,” and should be applied in all cases.58 He noted that the 
“presumption applies regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict 
between the American statute and a foreign law.”59 Furthermore, 
Justice Scalia explained that even when “a statute provides for some 
extraterritorial application, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality operates to limit that provision to its term.”60 
Finding no clear statement of extraterritorial effect in § 10(b), 
the Court held that the statute does not apply extraterritorially.61 
Next, the Court addressed the investors’ argument that sought only 
domestic application of the law because a substantial portion of 
National’s misconduct occurred in the U.S.62 Justice Scalia noted 
that “the presumption against extraterritorial application would be a 
craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some 
 
 54. Id. at 2876. 
 55. See Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas London, 147 F.3d 
118, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (“In outlining the extraterritorial reach of these provisions, courts have 
reasoned . . . that Congress would want to redress harms perpetrated abroad which have a 
substantial impact on investors or markets within the United States, or ‘effects.’”). 
 56. See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Under the 
conduct test, a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction if (1) the defendant’s activities in the 
United States were more than ‘merely preparatory’ to a securities fraud conducted 
elsewhere . . . and (2) these activities or culpable failures to act within the United States 
‘directly caused’ the claimed losses.”). 
 57. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878. 
 58. Id. at 2881. 
 59. Id. at 2878. 
 60. Id. at 2884. 
 61. Id. at 2883. Although the Court specifically stated that § 10(b) lacked “a clear 
statement of extraterritorial effect,” the Court noted that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is not a clear statement rule; the statute’s context may also be consulted to 
determine the statutory meaning. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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domestic activity is involved in the case.”63 Citing the employment 
dispute in Aramco, Justice Scalia explained that the “focus” of 
congressional concern in Title VII was not international issues such 
as the country of hiring or the nationality of the employee “but 
rather domestic employment.”64 In the Securities and Exchange Act, 
the Court concluded that the “focus” of § 10(b) is “not upon the 
place where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales 
of securities in the United States.”65 Thus, domestic activity may be 
enough to bring extraterritorial conduct into the range of a statute as 
long as the “focus” of the statute is upon the domestic activity. 
B. The Presumption against Extraterritoriality and NEPA 
1. Statutory language and legislative history 
The first and most important step in determining whether a 
statute applies extraterritorially is to examine its text for clear, 
affirmative language from Congress indicating legislative intent.66 A 
substantial review of the statutory text and the legislative history of 
NEPA has already been conducted elsewhere and is beyond the 
scope of this Comment;67 however, a general summary of the issue 
is worth mentioning. 
Despite arguments to the contrary,68 the overriding consensus 
from both the courts and literature indicates that the text and 
legislative history of NEPA is unclear and inconclusive with respect 
to its extraterritorial application.69 Advocates of a more expansive 
 
 63. Id. at 2884. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See id. at 2878 (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application, it has none.”). 
 67. See Gonzalez-Perez & Klein, supra note 5, at 777–85. 
 68. See Baynard, supra note 5, at 190–94. 
 69. See, e.g., Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 759 (D. Haw. 1990) (“Although 
the language of NEPA indicates that Congress was concerned with the global environment and 
the worldwide character of environmental problems, it does not explicitly provide that its 
requirements are to apply extraterritorially.”); Joan R. Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 557 (“While 
each of these statements provides a vehicle by which extraterritorial application may be inferred, 
none of these statements expressly addresses extraterritorial actions. . . . Thus, like the 
statutory language, the legislative history is too general to provide definitive answers. Thus, 
courts have been forced to develop their own standards for NEPA application.”); Gonzalez-Perez 
& Klein, supra note 5, at 784 (“The preceding analysis of the text, statutory structure, legislative 
history, and agency interpretations of NEPA demonstrate that there is no clear answer to the 
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view of NEPA focus on the broad language of the Act, which they 
contend indicates a purposeful directive to apply NEPA 
extraterritorially.70 Proponents of this expansive view note that 
when Congress declared a national environmental policy in the Act, 
it did so “recognizing the profound impact of man” on his 
environment, and directed all agencies to “maintain conditions 
under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony.”71 
These proponents also maintain that Congress directed federal 
agencies to include a detailed environmental report on all “major 
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment” to the “fullest extent possible.”72 
This language cited by the expansionists, however, seems to be 
exactly the type of “boiler plate language” Chief Justice Rehnquist 
deprecated in Aramco.73 The language fails to present the clearly 
expressed affirmative intention that is required to overcome the 
presumption against extraterritorial application of the law.74 
Although NEPA’s language does indicate that Congress was 
concerned about the global environment, it lacks any clear 
requirement to apply NEPA extraterritorially.75 
2. Case law 
Since the enactment of NEPA, courts have taken on the question 
of the extent that NEPA applies extraterritorially within a variety of 
contexts. In his 2006 article, Randall Abate argued that, in general, 
these cases can be categorized into different points along a 
“continuum of territories,” with one end of the continuum belonging 
to activity that occurs in the U.S. and the other end subsuming 
activity that occurs in foreign sovereign nations.76 In the middle, 
 
question of whether NEPA applies to agency actions abroad.”). 
 70. See Baynard, supra note 5, at 190–94. 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006) (National Environmental Policy Act). 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A)–(C). See also Baynard, supra note 5, at 192. 
 73. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 249–52 (1991). 
 74. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010). 
 75. See, e.g., Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 759 (D. Haw. 1990) (“Although 
the language of NEPA indicates that Congress was concerned with the global environment and 
the worldwide character of environmental problems, it does not explicitly provide that its 
requirements are to apply extraterritorially.”). 
 76. Randall S. Abate, Dawn of a New Era in the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. 
Environmental Statutes: A Proposal for an Integrated Judicial Standard Based on the Continuum of 
Context, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 87, 89 (2006). 
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Abate recognizes the “global commons”77 as areas in which a court 
may or may not apply the presumption against extraterritorial 
application, depending on additional foreign policy concerns.78 
Abate’s continuum presents an interesting and effective approach to 
understanding cases in which a party has attempted to apply NEPA 
extraterritorially. The next sections present a summary of cases 
organized under Abate’s “continuum of territories” concept. 
a. United States-controlled territory. Although the application of 
NEPA within the U.S. is not contested, a few courts have considered 
whether NEPA should apply in territories controlled by the U.S. In 
People of Enewetak v. Laird, the U.S. District Court of Hawaii held that 
the U.S. military is subject to NEPA when engaging in seismic 
studies and drilling operations within U.S. controlled trust 
territory79 near the Johnson Atoll.80 The district court emphasized 
the amount of control that the U.S. had over the Trust Territory and 
the fact that the people living within the territory did not have an 
independent government that would protect them from 
environmental actions caused by the U.S. that may be harmful to the 
environment.81 
In People of Saipan v. U.S. Department of Interior, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed a district court’s ruling that “NEPA 
applies to federal agencies operating in the Trust Territory,” but 
determined that the Trust Territory government was not a federal 
agency for the purposes of NEPA and thus not subject to NEPA’s 
requirements.82 Thus, both Enewetak and People of Saipan indicate 
 
 77. Abate uses the term “global commons” to mean Antarctica, areas in the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ), and the high seas. See id. at 89 n.12. 
 78. Id. at 89. 
 79. In 1945, the United Nations, in order to promote political and social advancement in 
certain regions, established an International Trusteeship System for the management of Trust 
Territories placed under it by agreement with individual States administering the territories. See 
The United Nations and Decolonization, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/ 
its.shtml (last accessed Sept. 10, 2013). 
 80. People of Enewetak v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 811, 813, 818 (D. Haw. 1973) (“In view of 
this expressed concern with the global ramifications of federal actions, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the Congress intended NEPA to apply in all areas under its exclusive control. In 
areas like the Trust Territory there is little, if any, need for concern about conflicts with United 
States foreign policy or the balance of world power.”). 
 81. Id. at 818. 
 82. People of Saipan by Guerrero v. U.S. Dep’t. of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 94–95 (9th Cir. 
1974). 
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that activities by federal agencies in U.S. controlled trust territories 
are subject to NEPA and its reporting requirements. 
b. Global commons. The question of NEPA’s extraterritorial 
application becomes less clear as the activity regulated by NEPA 
shifts from U.S.-controlled territory to areas within the global 
commons over which the U.S. does not exercise full control. 
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey, the D.C. Circuit examined 
whether the National Science Foundation was required to prepare an 
EIS for activity conducted in Antarctica.83 In considering the 
question of extraterritoriality, Judge Mikva described three 
categories in which the presumption against extraterritorial 
application does not apply.84 First, Mikva contended that the 
presumption does not apply when there is an affirmative action of 
Congress to extend the scope of a statute to conduct occurring 
beyond the borders of the U.S.85 Next, he contended that the 
presumption is inapplicable when failure to extend the scope of the 
statute to a foreign setting will result in adverse effects within the 
U.S.86 Finally, Mikva posited that the presumption is not valid where 
the conduct regulated by the government occurs within the U.S. 
borders, even though the effects are entirely extraterritorial.87 
Applying these three factors to NEPA, the D.C. Circuit Court 
argued that the application of NEPA to activity abroad would not 
raise any extraterritorial concerns because NEPA is designed to 
regulate the decisions of U.S. federal agencies, which are “uniquely 
domestic” because the decision making processes occur “almost 
exclusively in this country and involve the workings of the United 
States government.”88 
Despite this seemingly dispositive analysis, the court ultimately 
retreated from such a broad determination of NEPA’s extraterritorial 
reach, which essentially relegated its application of the three factors 
 
 83. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Antarctica is part of 
the “global commons” in that it has been reserved for mutual peaceful cooperation by 
multilateral treaty. See Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. 
 84. Massey, 986 F.2d at 531. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 532. 
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to mere dictum.89 Instead of basing its holding on the location of 
government decision makers, the court turned to the unique status 
of Antarctica as a sovereign-less continent as strong evidence that 
the presumption should not apply.90 The court noted that the U.S. 
had some measure of control over transportation and rescue 
activities and research stations in Antarctica.91 Citing to the lack of 
any conflict between the laws of the U.S. and any foreign nation, the 
Massey court concluded that U.S. foreign policy interests do not 
outweigh the EIS requirement imposed by NEPA.92 In the end, the 
court expressly declined to decide whether NEPA applied in cases 
dealing with actual foreign sovereigns and limited its holding to the 
National Science Foundation’s activities in Antarctica.93 
c. Foreign territories and the foreign policy exception. Courts are 
usually hesitant to apply NEPA to activities that occur abroad in 
foreign sovereign nations. In general, courts cite two reasons for this 
reluctance. First, courts have suggested that foreign relations factors 
that may affect the diplomatic relations between the U.S. and a 
foreign sovereign should act as a restraint in extending U.S. law 
extraterritorially.94 This inquiry often leads the courts to ask 
whether the advantages of an EIS would outweigh U.S. foreign policy 
interests.95 Second, courts have indicated that international law 
principles, including treaties and other agreements, should not be 
intruded upon by the extraterritorial application of NEPA.96 
 
 89. Id. at 534. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 535. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 647 F.2d 1345, 
1357 (D.C. Cir. 1981) [hereinafter NRC] (“We do honor to the sovereignty of national 
governments, our own included, when we respect foreign public policy by not automatically 
displacing theirs with ours. This calls for a thorough understanding of our interests as defined 
by Congress we can then reasonably balance the scope of our own regulation alongside the 
rightful regulatory jurisdiction of the [other foreign sovereign].”). 
 95. See Massey, 986 F.2d at 535 (considering whether U.S. foreign policy interests would 
be threatened if NEPA were to be enforced). 
 96. See NRC, 647 F.2d at 1357 (“[T]he exercise of jurisdiction by any governmental body 
in the United States is subject to limitations reflecting principles of international and 
constitutional law, as well as the strictures of the particular statute governing that body’s 
conduct.” (quoting F.T.C. v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1315 
(D.C. Cir. 1980))); NEPA Coal. of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466, 468 (D.D.C. 1993) 
(explaining that “the presumption against extraterritoriality [particularly applies]” in cases 
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In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Committee 
(NRC), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“Commission”) 
approved the application of a license to export nuclear materials to 
the Philippines.97 The Natural Resources Defense Council argued 
that NEPA applies to the Commission’s decision and an EIS should 
have been prepared in relation to the application approval.98 The 
D.C. Circuit held that NEPA does not apply to nuclear export 
decisions, reasoning that important foreign policy concerns and 
deference to the executive’s “prerogative” in foreign relations limit 
the extraterritorial reach of the statute.99 The court explained that 
the foreign policy concerns of non-proliferation and the importance 
of a global nuclear cooperation to solve a global problem countervail 
America’s interest in unilateral environmental standards.100 To 
support the idea that “cooperation, not unilateral action” consistent 
with U.S. foreign policy should be enough to limit the extraterritorial 
application of NEPA, the NRC court cited NEPA itself and its charge 
to: 
[R]ecognize the worldwide and long-range character of 
environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign 
policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, 
resolutions, and programs designed to maximize the international 
cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of 
mankind’s world environment.101 
The NRC court interpreted this provision as evidence that 
Congress intended any extraterritorial application of NEPA to be 
balanced with foreign policy considerations and cooperation with 
foreign sovereigns.102 
Other courts have applied the foreign policy exception delineated 
in NRC. In Greenpeace USA v. Stone, the District Court of Hawaii 
applied the foreign policy exception to a military operation occurring 
overseas.103 The U.S. Department of Defense planned to dispose of 
 
involving “clear foreign policy and treaty concerns”). 
 97. NRC, 647 F.2d at 1350. 
 98. Id. at 1355. 
 99. Id. at 1348. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1366 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1976) (emphasis added)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp 749 (D. Haw. 1990). 
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chemical weapons it had been storing in Germany by shipping the 
weapons to the Johnson Atoll.104 The disposal was to occur in three 
stages—the transport of weapons through Germany, the transport of 
weapons through the high seas, and the final disposal of weapons in 
the U.S.-controlled Johnston Atoll.105 The agency prepared three 
EISs for the project.106 Greenpeace claimed that the agency’s 
segmentation of its disposal plan into separate parts was improper 
and a full EIS should have been performed to include the transport of 
the weapons through Germany.107 The court held that foreign policy 
implications barred extraterritorial application of NEPA to the 
movement of munitions in Germany, reasoning that the President’s 
commitment to Germany to dispose of the weapons was probably a 
result of diplomatic efforts and other policy concerns that are 
“beyond the purview of [the] court’s review.”108 
Significantly, the court explained that its decision was limited to 
environmental impacts of the Germany transport segment and 
suggested that “NEPA may require a federal agency to prepare an 
EIS for action taken abroad, especially where U.S. agency’s action 
abroad has direct environmental impacts within this country, or 
where there has clearly been a total lack of environmental 
assessment by the federal agency or foreign country involved.”109 
With this suggestion, the court seemed to indicate that direct 
environmental impacts that fall within the foreign country may be 
enough to trigger NEPA reporting requirements on extraterritorial 
activity. However, the court did not discuss whether indirect effects 
would be enough to trigger a NEPA EIS requirement. 
A treaty relation between the U.S. and a foreign sovereign nation 
is a second factor that triggers the foreign policy exception and acts 
as a bar to applying NEPA extraterritorially. In NEPA Coalition of 
Japan v. Aspin, the D.C. District Court held that U.S. military bases in 
Japan were not subject to NEPA’s EIS requirement.110 The court 
explained that unlike the Antarctica continent in Massey, where the 
U.S. exercised some legislative control over aspects of Antarctica, the 
 
 104. Id. at 752. 
 105. Id. at 753. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 759. 
 108. Id. at 760. 
 109. Id. at 761. 
 110. NEPA Coal. of Japan v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466, 467 (D.D.C. 1993). 
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U.S.’ control of its military base in Aspin was subject to treaties with 
Japan.111 The court maintained that applying NEPA to the military  
 
bases in Japan would risk interfering with longstanding treaty 
relations between the U.S. and Japan.112 
The foreign relations analysis is not always consistently applied. 
In Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, environmental organizations 
brought an action for declarative and injunctive relief against two 
federal agencies, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
(“OPIC”) and Export-Import Bank, which had loaned money to fund 
international fossil fuel projects within various foreign sovereign 
nations (mostly in Africa) but did not prepare EISs for the 
projects.113 Citing the presumption against extraterritoriality, the 
court denied the agencies’ motion for summary judgment, which 
argued that NEPA should not be applied to projects located in 
foreign nations for three reasons. First, the court noted and accepted 
the environmental organizations’ argument that NEPA should apply 
to the agencies’ funding decisions because the projects would 
significantly affect the domestic environment.114 Second, the court, 
following Judge Mikva’s reasoning in Massey, explained that the 
decision processes of OPIC and Export-Import Bank occurred in the 
U.S. and therefore did not govern conduct abroad.115 Finally, in a 
terse one-sentence wave-of-the-hand,116 the court rejected any 
arguments regarding foreign policy 117 OPIC had argued that foreign 
policy concerns should bar the application of NEPA to the projects it 
funded abroad.118 Specifically, OPIC asserted that it operated in 
particular countries pursuant only to presidential directive, and that 
each project required implementation and approval from the host 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, 488. F. Supp. 2d 889, 892 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 114. Id. at 908. 
 115. Id. 
 116. “[N]otwithstanding [the agencies’] arguments regarding foreign policy relations, 
there is evidence to suggest that the [the agencies] may have control over the manner in which 
these projects operate.” Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Defendant OPIC’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Memorandum in Support 
and Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 22, Friends of the Earth v. 
Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. 02-4106), 2006 WL 398003. 
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country.119 The court rejected that argument, contending that the 
agencies “may have control over the manner in which [the] projects  
 
 
operate,” possibly implying that the agency is not as beholden as it 
contended in its briefs to strict executive control.120 
Although Mosbacher only determined the appropriateness of the 
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, the case is important 
because it brought out many of the arguments that have been 
presented in favor of applying NEPA extraterritorially. These include 
the position that NEPA does not impose a substantive requirement 
to govern conduct abroad and the position that extraterritorial 
activity affects the domestic environment.121 More significantly, 
Mosbacher signaled potentially strained reasoning in the question of 
the extraterritorial application of NEPA. The Mosbacher court seemed 
to accept Judge Mikva’s position that NEPA’s regulation of agency 
decision making, which occurs domestically, should not be 
considered extraterritorial regulation, even if the activity that must 
be included in an EIS occurs extraterritorially.122 Mosbacher embraces 
this position without also engaging in substantive examination of 
potential foreign policy concerns.123 This analysis ignores the 
reasoning behind the Massey court’s narrow holding and its deep 
investigation into the foreign relations concerns that may arise from 
applying NEPA beyond U.S. borders.124 The court in Massey 
explained that an important factor in determining whether the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies is the extent of 
legislative control over the territory at issue.125 In Massey, the 
territory in question was sovereign-less Antarctica; however, 
Mosbacher concerned actual foreign sovereigns, an even stronger 
reason for the court to take a harder look at foreign relations 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 908. 
 121. Id. This opinion was issued before the Supreme Court decided Morrison v. National 
Australian Bank Ltd. The argument that extraterritorial activity should be regulated under NEPA 
when there are some domestic effects was arguably addressed and dismissed in Morrison. See 
supra notes 59–72 and accompanying text. 
 122. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 918. 
 123. See supra notes 114–20 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra notes 89–93 and accompanying text. 
 125. Envtl. Def. Fund v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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concerns.126 
 
3. Indirect effects 
Until recently, most of the cases that have addressed the 
extraterritoriality of NEPA have not dealt with the issue of whether 
indirect effects that occur extraterritorially should be included in an 
agency EIS or EA. The environmental group plaintiffs in Mosbacher 
argued that Export-Import Bank should consider both direct and 
indirect greenhouse gas emissions from the projects that it 
financed.127 However, the court did not deal with the issue of 
indirect greenhouse gas emissions in its ruling on petitions for 
summary judgments. 
In Sierra Club v. Clinton, environmental groups led by the Sierra 
Club challenged the sufficiency of an EIS prepared by federal 
agencies for the permits for two pipelines that would cross the U.S.-
Canada border.128 The Sierra Club argued that the agencies’ EIS 
failed to consider the indirect and cumulative impacts of the 
pipeline, including the transboundary impact of increased 
greenhouse gas emissions due to a likely increase in the exploitation 
of Canadian tar sands oil fields.129 The court held that the agencies’ 
decision not to include the transboundary impact of increased tar 
sands oil production complied with NEPA requirements, finding that 
there was “not a sufficient causal relationship between the [pipeline] 
and the development of the oil sands.”130 The court noted the fact 
that the tar sands oil development is located within the jurisdiction 
of Canada, and concluded that “because the activities in 
Canada . . . are beyond the review of NEPA, the [EIS] is not 
insufficient for its failure to consider or attempt to mitigate 
transboundary impacts.”131 
Although the presumption against extraterritoriality acts as a 
wall that limits applying NEPA to activity conducted within a foreign 
sovereign, it is less clear what the presumption does when, as in the 
 
 126. Id. at 529; Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 892. 
 127. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 902. 
 128. Sierra Club v. Clinton, 746 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1028 (D. Minn. 2010). 
 129. Id. at 1043. 
 130. Id. at 1045. 
 131. Id. at 1046. 
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coal shipping terminal example, the foreign sovereign activity arises 
as indirect effects (burning coal) from domestic activity (transporting 
coal). Should a domestic connection neutralize the presumption and 
require an agency to consider in its EIS activity that occurs 
extraterritorially? Should the presumption break the connection 
between the domestic activity and the foreign activity, thus relieving 
the agency from considering the indirect effects of conduct that 
occurs within a foreign state? Although the law is relatively silent on 
this matter, the strength of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality should act as a barrier that shields the indirect 
effects of activity that occurs in a foreign sovereign from the NEPA 
EIS requirement. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TRANSNATIONAL LAWMAKING FACTORS 
In cases like the recent coal shipping terminal conflict on the 
West Coast, the main activity to be regulated—here, the transport 
and shipping of coal across state lines to its ultimate exit point on 
the West Coast—takes place within the territorial borders of the 
U.S. Under principles of international law, this activity, and arguably 
any indirect effects that may result from the activity, may be 
regulated by the U.S. under the territorial recognition of jurisdiction 
to prescribe law.132 However, just because a domestic activity may be 
regulated under the territorial principle of international law does not 
mean that all of its indirect effects should be regulated under 
international law. When an activity has connections with another 
country, other relevant factors may preclude a state from exercising 
jurisdiction over the activity.133 If an exercise of the jurisdiction to 
 
 132. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1)(a) (1987) (“[A] state 
has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes 
place within its territory . . . .”); see also Browne C. Lewis, It’s A Small World After All: Making 
the Case for the Extraterritorial Application of the National Environmental Policy Act, 25 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2143, 2176 (2004) (“Because environmental pollution is mobile, there is always the 
possibility that a project in a foreign country can have adverse effects on the environment of the 
United States. As a consequence, an American governmental agency should not be allowed to 
sponsor a project in a foreign country without doing any type of environmental analysis. The 
territorial principle thus supports the application of United States laws, including NEPA, to 
prevent environmental pollution from negatively impacting the territory of the United States.”). 
 133. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(1) (1987) (“Even when 
one of the bases for jurisdiction under § 402 is present, a state may not exercise jurisdiction to 
prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when 
the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.”). 
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prescribe is “unreasonable,” then a state may not exercise 
jurisdiction over the activity.134 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law (“Restatement”) lists eight factors to consider when 
determining if jurisdiction over a person or activity is reasonable.135 
Three factors are relevant in examining whether a federal agency 
must include in its reporting the indirect effects from extraterritorial 
activity. These factors include the link of the activity to the territory 
of the regulating State, the importance of the regulation to the 
international political, legal, and economic systems, and the interest 
of another State in regulating the activity.  
A. Link of the Activity to the Territory of the Regulating State 
The first factor that the Restatement suggests to analyze when 
determining whether jurisdiction to prescribe over an activity would 
be reasonable is the “the extent to which the activity takes place 
within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect 
upon or in the territory.”136 Although the direct effects of climate 
change, along with the direct effect of any transboundary air 
pollution that may occur from extraterritorial activity,137 would 
clearly bolster the case for jurisdiction, the evidence is less 
persuasive with indirect effects caused from extraterritorial activity. 
In fact, by definition, “indirect effects” seem to cut against the 
linkage requirement that an activity must have a “substantial, direct, 
and foreseeable effect upon the territory.”138 
B. Importance of the Regulation to the International Political, Legal, and 
Economic Systems 
The second factor that cuts against the application of NEPA to 
indirect effects from extraterritorial activity is the importance of 
 
 134. Id.; see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 821 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2)(a)–(h) (1987). 
 136. Id. § 403(2)(a). 
 137. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Trail Smelter Arb. 
Trib. 1938). 
 138. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2)(a) (1987) (emphasis 
added). See also United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 688 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(applying a “direct effects” requirement in a case involving the extraterritoriality of the Sherman 
Act). 
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international law in creating a global solution to climate change.139 
International efforts by the U.N. and other organizations to broker 
agreements by nations to limit greenhouse gas emissions should not 
be imposed on by domestic laws applied extraterritorially that 
distend unilateral environmental standards from a single nation. 
Domestic law should implement international environmental 
agreements, not the other way around. Although NEPA does not 
create domestic law, NEPA analysis is significant to inform agency 
decisions. 
1. The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 
Human-invoked climate change is a global problem. Although 
individual states influence in various degrees the amount of 
greenhouse gas emitted into the atmosphere, unilateral action absent 
international agreements by individual sovereign nations will not 
solve the global warming problem.140 Instead, a solution should 
come through international agreements brought on by international 
consensus.141 
Recognizing this concept, the United Nations ratified the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) in 
1992, which contains principles and obligations to address the 
problem of climate change.142 This agreement acknowledges that 
“the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible 
cooperation by all countries . . . .”143 However, the agreement 
cautions that in order to be “effective,” countries should cooperate 
“in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities and their social and economic 
conditions.”144 Consequently, the UNFCCC includes different 
 
 139. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2)(e) (1987). 
 140. Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Global Warming: Integrating United States and International 
Law, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 221, 222 (1990) (“There is no doubt that global warming cannot be 
arrested by the actions of individual states acting unilaterally. Only global norms and 
international standards that are universally accepted will suffice. Such standards alone can 
provide for the reduction of trace gases that are causing global warming.”). 
 141. See id. at 254. (“Safeguarding the world requires a truly global effort. This effort must 
include the domain of international law.”). 
 142. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
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responsibilities for developed countries and developing countries.145 
For example, the developed countries that ratified the UNFCCC 
committed to measures not required by developing countries, such 
as the obligations to adopt national policies to mitigate climate  
 
 
change, to calculate emissions of GHGs, and to provide financial 
resources to developing countries.146 
In 1997, five years after signing the UNFCCC, the UNFCCC’s 
“supreme body,” the Conference of the Parties (“COP”), met again 
in Kyoto to discuss and enact protocols targeted to make the 
UNFCCC more effective. What followed was the Kyoto Protocol, 
which required thirty-nine developed countries and the European 
Union to meet targets for greenhouse gas emissions by percentages 
ranging from an 8 percent reduction in emissions to a 10 percent 
increase in emissions,147 with the total combined target for 
greenhouse gas emissions equivalent to a 5.2 percent reduction.148 
Like the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol recognized differences 
between developing and developed countries and adjusted its 
requirements accordingly.149 In fact, three major developing 
countries—China, India, and Brazil—did not even sign the Kyoto 
Protocol.150 The U.S. signed the agreement, but the Senate did not 
ratify it.151 
The structure and provisions of these two important 
international agreements cut against the appropriateness of applying 
NEPA to indirect effects that occur extraterritorially. By applying 
NEPA extraterritorially, the U.S. would effectively bypass 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998). 
 148. Clare Breidenich et al., The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 315, 320 (1998). 
 149. See id. (reporting that the base year for emission targets was adjusted due to economic 
and other country-specific factors: “For most parties, 1990 is the official base year. However, 
certain countries with economies in transition are authorized by a decision of the Conference of 
the Parties to use a different base year, and other countries with economies in transition may 
apply to use a different base year.”). 
 150. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 509 (2007). 
 151. Id. See also Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, supra note 147. 
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international negotiations and signal to other countries that it 
wishes to compel its own standards on activity that occurs outside 
its borders. This imposition of U.S. environmental standards ignores 
key features of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, namely the 
idea that individual countries, especially developing countries, 
should be subject to different emission standards than other 
countries. Some may contend that the Senate’s failure to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol might indicate that the U.S. has not fully negotiated 
an international standard, thus mitigating any signal of defiance 
from the U.S. However, the U.S. president’s signature, along with 
U.S. diplomatic actions during the treaty negotiations, is what other 
nations see when the treaty is signed in their presence—not a Senate 
vote conducted weeks or months later. 
In addition, at least in the case of U.S. coal exports, requiring an 
EIS compliance to include the indirect effects of extraterritorial 
greenhouse gas emissions that result from an export of commodities 
ignores the overarching international solution proposed by the Kyoto 
Protocol whereby each nation is responsible for its own emissions, 
not its exports of material that potentially may be emitted by 
another country. In fact, there has been no serious proposal or 
discussion in any international forum that has addressed the 
regulation of commodity exports to other countries as a means of 
reducing global emissions. This dearth of proposals likely exists 
because the international community has recognized that emissions 
targets and monitoring schemes like those proposed in the Kyoto 
Protocol are the most effective way to measure greenhouse gas 
emissions and hold nations accountable for these emissions—not 
through the regulation of such attenuated channels as raw materials 
exports or manipulation of the price of commodities.152 Although 
the approach of the Kyoto Protocol arguably contains many 
flaws153—the most critical being that the world’s largest emitters of 
greenhouse gases (including the U.S.) are not subject to any of its 
 
 152. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
supra note 147, at 22. 
 153. See, e.g., Denee A. Diluigi, Comment, Kyoto’s So-Called “Fatal Flaws”: A Potential 
Springboard for Domestic Greenhouse Gas Regulation, 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 693, 709 (2002) 
(noting that the Bush administration identified two main concerns with the Kyoto Protocol: “(1) 
the lack of binding reduction and limitation commitments on developing countries during the 
first compliance period and (2) the perceived potential for adverse economic impact on Kyoto-
compliant industrialized countries.”). 
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binding provisions—the eventual aim of a systematic and unified 
international agreement to regulate greenhouse gases is an 
important reason to limit the extraterritorial application of NEPA. 
Some may contend that applying NEPA extraterritorially is not a 
matter of the U.S. imposing unilateral standards because NEPA does 
not prescribe action—it merely forces federal agencies to take a 
“hard look” at its actions.154 Other commentators have argued that 
because NEPA is only a procedural regulation, the potential clashes 
with the laws and other standards of foreign sovereigns are virtually 
nonexistent.155 However, despite the seemingly passive nature of 
NEPA requirements, regulations that have effect beyond domestic 
boundaries—often referred to by Harold Koh, legal advisor of the 
State Department and former dean of Yale Law School, as 
“transnational law”—may bring consequences that are often 
unpredictable. For example, evidence from state practice indicates 
that environmental regulations are often mirrored by other states.156 
Moreover, extraterritorial application by one country can elicit 
retaliation and contention.157 This potential for unpredictability and 
international discord is discussed below. 
2. Transnational legal process and unpredictable retaliation 
In his seminal article on why nations obey international law, 
Dean Koh reintroduced the concept of transnational legal process, 
the “theory . . . of how public and private actors . . . interact in a 
variety of public and private, domestic and international fora to 
make, interpret, enforce, and ultimately, internalize rules of 
 
 154. See Chertok, supra note 9, at 775–76. 
 155. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 132, at 2184 (“Because NEPA is a procedural statute, it is 
unlikely to conflict with the laws of a foreign country. Procedural statutes like NEPA seldom 
clash with the laws of a foreign country. NEPA’s application is limited to major federal actions, 
thus, it would not directly interfere with projects that private companies implement in foreign 
countries.”). 
 156. See, e.g., Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental 
Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615, 627 (2009) (reporting that one pathway of an emerging global 
environmental law is transplantation, “the deliberate copying and adaption of significant 
portions of statutes or particular doctrines of law by one country from another”). 
 157. See, e.g., Shi-Ling Hsu & Austen L. Parrish, Litigating Canada-U.S. Transboundary 
Harm: International Environmental Lawmaking and the Threat of Extraterritorial Reciprocity, 48 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 6 (2007) (forecasting that the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws by U.S. courts 
to solve transboundary disputes will prompt Canadians to “explore the extraterritorial 
application of their own domestic laws to remedy transboundary environmental harm”). 
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transnational law.”158 Dean Koh argues that part of the reason that 
actors obey international law is due to repeated interaction with 
other governmental and nongovernmental actors.159 This 
interaction, over time, causes states to “internalize international law 
by incorporating it into their domestic and political structures,  
 
 
through executive action, legislation, and judicial decisions,” taking 
into account international norms.160 
One way that states interact with international law is through 
the process of transplantation.161 Professor Alan Watson describes 
transplantation as the “moving of a rule or a system of law from one 
country to another, or from one people to another.”162 One of the 
most significant examples of legal transplantation in international 
environmental law is the spread of environmental impact assessment 
requirements across the globe.163 
Beginning with NEPA in the U.S., many other nations have 
adopted their own requirement for environmental impact 
assessments.164 For example, China, Japan and Korea have all 
adopted environmental impact assessment rules.165 Since the 1990s, 
many multilateral agreements have included environmental impact 
assessments provisions, including the UNFCCC, the Stockholm 
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, and the U.N. Economic 
Commission for Europe.166 The U.N. Economic Commission for 
Europe requires environmental impact assessments in transboundary 
situations and obligates states “to notify and consult each other on 
all major projects under consideration that are likely to have 
significant adverse environmental impact across boundaries.”167 
 
 158. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183–84 (1996). 
 159. Id. at 203. 
 160. Id. at 204 (emphasis added). 
 161. ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 21–22 (2d. 
ed. 1993). 
 162. Id. at 21. 
 163. See Yang & Percival, supra note 156, at 627. 
 164. Id. at 628. 
 165. International Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Agencies, NAT’L ENVTL. POL’Y ACT, 
http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/eia.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
 166. See Yang & Percival, supra note 156, at 629. 
 167. Id. (quoting Introduction to Espoo Convention, UNITED NATIONS ECON. COMMISSION FOR 
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The fact that so many nations have adopted the EIS concept from 
NEPA, at first glance, seems to support the argument that NEPA 
should be applied extraterritorially so that the U.S. can continue to 
be a leader in the fight against global climate change. However, 
instead of leading in the fight against climate change, an 
extraterritorial push of U.S. climate standards might generate a 
retaliatory spark as other nations attempt to mimic the U.S.’ 
application of its EIS statute. Rather than leading the fight against 
climate change, the application of NEPA extraterritorially might 
actually create a hodgepodge of attempts by countries to analyze the 
indirect effects of their exports based on similar provisions into their 
own EIS statutory scheme. Such efforts could result in embarrassing 
diplomatic misunderstandings and even restrictions or disruptions to 
international trade while they conduct environmental assessments of 
conduct occurring in other nations. 
One example of how this retaliation might occur comes from the 
antitrust arena. Since 1945, the Supreme Court has held that the 
Sherman Act has extraterritorial effect.168 Other countries have 
responded to this encroachment into their jurisdiction by enacting 
retaliatory legislation of their own.169 
While it may be argued that international discord is an important 
aspect of the transnational lawmaking norm creating process because 
it facilitates cross-nation negotiation, the potential economic and 
diplomatic consequences of such discord should not be ignored. 
Even if in the long run, as the transnational process theorists 
posit,170 negotiations create a solidified international norm and help 
lead to a more unified climate change agreement, the interim 
 
EUR., http://www.unece.org/env/eia/eia.html (last visited on Mar. 8, 2013)). 
 168. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443–44 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 169. Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritoriality in an Age of Globalization: The Hartford Fire Case, 
1993 SUP. CT. REV. 289, 324 (“The flagrant use by the United States of extraterritorial measures, 
particularly in the antitrust field, has led to a variety of foreign retaliatory measures, such as 
blocking and claw-back statutes. Such retaliation harms U.S. interests, both by interfering with 
U.S. law enforcement and, much more importantly, by destroying a spirit of cooperation and 
common purpose in solving international economic problems.”). 
 170. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 158, at 204 (“[D]omestic decision-making becomes 
‘enmeshed’ with international legal norms, as institutional arrangements for the making and 
maintenance of an international commitment become entrenched in domestic legal and political 
processes. It is through this repeated process of interaction and internalization that international 
law acquires its ‘stickiness,’ that nation-states acquire their identity, and that nations define 
promoting the rule of international law as part of their national self-interest.”). 
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economic pain may not be worth the effort.171 
3. Leakage 
Another economic reason that vitiates the case for 
extraterritorial application of NEPA is the concept of leakage. 
Leakage of emissions occurs because regulation that is only 
implemented in a few regions or territories encourages emission 
activities to move, or “leak,” to under-regulated areas.172 In the case 
of coal exports, a strict environmental policy that makes it 
prohibitively difficult for U.S. coal producers to trade with Asian 
countries might encourage other coal producing countries (like 
China, Indonesia, and Australia) to invest more money in their coal 
mining industry. These countries might produce coal that burns less 
cleanly than U.S. coal, or whose coal industries are subject to coal 
mining regulation that is less severe than in the U.S. The leakage 
theory posits that the net emissions will not be affected by the 
restricting regulation by a single country or territory, and might even 
increase due to the regulation.173 
One of the main drivers of leakage is local, or sub-global, 
regulation of emissions; asymmetrical regulation schemes act as an 
impetus for the relocation of emission sources.174 The application of 
NEPA to indirect effects of extraterritorial activity increases the sub-
global regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. Although NEPA is 
wholly procedural and does not dictate any decision, its burdensome 
compliance requirements and regulatory uncertainty may cause 
energy companies and other entities to exit the U.S. market and 
relocate operations to other territories. While some may laud this as 
a victory for the environment, the leakage effect may indicate that 
such a relocation will not cause a net change to emissions, but may 
actually increase the global amount of greenhouse gas emissions, in 
addition to possibly proliferating other harmful environmental 
practices. 
 
 171. As economist John Maynard Keynes famously observed, “In the long run we are all 
dead.” JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923). 
 172. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate 
Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1967 (2007). 
 173. See, e.g., id. at 1969 n.26 (citing a study that showed an international greenhouse gas 
leakage rate of up to 130%, “meaning that [greenhouse gas] control policies in . . . 
industrialized countries may actually lead to higher global emissions”). 
 174. Id. at 1968. 
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4. Practical political considerations 
Practical political and foreign relations considerations should 
also limit the application of NEPA to extraterritorial activity. Federal 
agencies are responsible for preparing project EIS and EA analyses, 
although outside consultants may prepare the analysis if 
independently reviewed by the agency.175 This preparation is 
conducted in stages, which include a scoping of the issues, a 
circulation of the draft, and the submission of the final analysis.176 
Within the draft stage, the agency is required to seek notice and 
comment from the public and other interested groups and 
agencies.177 During this comment period, agencies often turn to the 
project proponent or other interested parties for information not 
available to the agency.178 In addition, project proponents often seek 
to involve themselves in the pre-scoping process in order to help 
define the project’s scope and facilitate the preparation of the 
scoping draft.179 
The importance of participation between the agency, the public, 
and the project proponents shows the difficulty an agency might 
have in adequately analyzing the indirect effects of foreign activity. 
Agencies and NEPA consultants are not well suited to gather facts 
and analyze impacts from extraterritorial activity, such as a foreign 
country’s consumption of coal. In order for an environmental impact 
analysis to be done correctly and comprehensively, the agency should 
obtain information from the importing country. A scenario where 
the Wyoming office of the Bureau of Land Management or a 
Montana U.S. Forest Service agent conducts meetings and 
negotiations with representatives of the Chinese government 
without encroaching upon other U.S. political and foreign relations 
interests is hard to imagine. Such an approach would present 
countless opportunities for political embarrassment and 
misunderstandings. Moreover, the practical consideration of 
coordination between agencies and foreign governments should also 
 
 175. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5 (2012). 
 176. Chertok, supra note 9, at 781. 
 177. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.6(b). Notice is required to be published in the Federal Register for 
actions of national interest. 
 178. Craig Galli, The Project Proponent, Third-Party Contractors, and the Administrative Record, 
2010 No. 4 RMMLF-INST Paper No. 9 (2010). 
 179. Id. 
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be taken into account. It is also likely that most federal agencies do 
not have Chinese or Japanese translation capabilities or foreign 
policy expertise. 
C. Interest of Another State in Regulating the Activity 
Finally, the third factor this Comment will examine from the 
Restatement involves examining “the extent to which another state 
may have an interest in regulating the activity.”180 Federal agencies 
should not have to apply indirect effects from extraterritorial activity 
to NEPA reporting requirements because other foreign states have 
an important interest in creating their own environmental standards. 
Furthermore, states also have an important interest in establishing 
their own standards for importing and exporting raw materials. 
Therefore, in the context of coal exports from the U.S., applying 
NEPA to the indirect effects of activity occurring extraterritorially in 
Asian nations would not only intrude upon these countries’ 
environmental standards, it would also conflict with their import and 
export standards. 
Courts have recognized that NEPA reporting requirements may 
conflict with the export and import interests of foreign states. In 
NRC, the court examined whether the domestic decision process of a 
federal agency constituted an American intrusion on the sovereignty 
of a foreign nation.181 The court noted that “[t]he export of any 
commodity across national boundaries calls into play, and 
sometimes into conflict, the national interests of the exporter-
country and the importer-country.”182 The court concluded that 
“conditioning exports licenses on the satisfaction of standards 
fashioned in the United States may unnecessarily displace domestic 
regulation by the government of the [foreign sovereign].”183 
Other foreign nations will place different priorities on interests 
that they have to weigh in creating these standards. By unilaterally 
imposing our standards on other countries, we are straight-jacketing 
them into weighing the interests in the exact same way that we do. 
This is especially problematic when the science is so uncertain. 
 
 180. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(2)(c) (1987). 
 181. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See supra notes 97–102 and 
accompanying text. 
 182. NRC, 647 F.2d at 1356. 
 183. Id. 
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In many of its treaties and agreements, the U.S. has recognized 
the important interest of foreign states to regulate their own 
environmental standards. For example, in recent free trade 
agreements with Chile, South Korea, Australia, Oman, and Panama, 
the U.S. has recognized “the right of each Party to establish its own 
levels of environmental protection and its own environmental 
development priorities.”184 Not only do these treaty provisions show 
the importance of each state developing its own standards for 
environmental regulation, but they also imply recognition by the 
U.S. that foreign sovereign states are entitled to determine their own 
level of environmental regulation. For example, China or South 
Korea should not be constrained by U.S. environmental policies to 
determine its best source for coal. If a sovereign nation wants to 
import coal from the U.S. rather than create more domestic 
production, it should be able to do so without the U.S. limiting 
exports through delays and project derailment imposed by NEPA 
examining the foreign nation’s domestic activity. If U.S. courts 
interpret NEPA as requiring federal agencies to consider indirect 
effects from foreign sovereigns in their EIS and EA, the U.S. would 
in effect be applying its own environmental standards to other 
foreign sovereigns, which is contrary to a reasonable application of 
jurisdiction to prescribe principles and contrary to the U.S. 
executive’s own understanding of the right of foreign nations to 
develop their own levels of environmental protection. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The battle over U.S. coal exports detailed above is just a preview 
of the burgeoning effort by environmental organizations to use 
 
 184. Free Trade Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic Of 
Korea, U.S.-S. Kor., Mar. 15, 2012, T.I.A.S. No. 12–0315, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta/final-text. See also United States–Australia Free 
Trade Agreement, with Annexes and Related Exchange of Letters, May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/australian-fta/final-
text; United States–Chile Free Trade Agreement, with Annexes and Related Exchanges of 
Letters, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text; Agreement between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of the Oman on the Establishment of a Free 
Trade Area, U.S.-Oman, Jan. 19 2006, 19 U.S.C. 3805, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/oman-fta/final-text; United States–Panama Trade Promotion 
Agreement, U.S.-Pan., June 28, 2007, Pub. L. No. 112–43, 125 Stat. 407, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/panama-tpa/final-text. 
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NEPA to limit adverse effects of global climate change. NEPA’s 
reporting requirements are certainly important because they force 
U.S. agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their 
decisions. However, NEPA should not be stretched and pulled in 
order to encompass more activity than it was meant to bear. The 
application of NEPA to indirect effects of extraterritorial activity 
violates the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law, diminishes the effectiveness of international efforts to solve 
global climate change, and may cause discord with foreign relations 
between the U.S. and other sovereign nations. Federal agencies, 
therefore, should not be required to consider indirect effects of 
extraterritorial activity under NEPA. 
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